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Plato history pdf torrent

plato history pdf torrent

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He is unique, singular, not because he resembles nobody but because he claims not only that he knows nothing but that he is nothing, as he replies to Alcibiades20 — another manner of avoiding to be a subject. His obedience to the laws and the death it entails are more powerful proofs of the injustice of these laws than any protestation against them could be.

And even if the desire to learn is in Socrates the strongest of all, it does not banish all other desires either entirely or for ever: Socrates too desires to win, he too becomes angry, loses heart, does not know which way to go, and he too is staggered by the beauty of a young man whose cloak has fallen open.

These modalities of thinking he introduces into history, and history accordingly becomes anhistorical. For if Socrates is to be believed, what is at stake in philosophy is not the completion of an initial decision developed after its own logic, but the reiteration of a difference which is re-experienced differently each time for it can only be grasped through a complex interplay of similarities and 20 Smp. Once understood in this way, Socrates belongs to no period, to any epoch, nor is he a moment or a turning-point in universal history.

He embodies a way of philosophizing that no history of philosophy can incorporate without misunderstanding it, on pain of becoming disorganized. Standing on the margins of this history, he is the absolute freedom of a thought that is capable of breaking free from the empirical in general and from its own empirical situation.

His abstaining from writing, his summons to reexamine any result that might appear to be final, the puzzling way he forgets specifications he himself introduced, his barrenness, his refusal to have disciples — so many signs of a freedom that will not abide being weighed down but always has the energy to get underway, and whose enthusiasm is an enthusiasm for the possible, not the certain. Socrates does not reject any heritage, he has no memory of any — none anyway while he is questioning and searching.

What about Plato? Socrates's contemporaries are not his contemporaries, and he has a selective, respectful or ironic memory of them, but a memory all the same. To capture the sophist and deprive him of his last refuge, it is necessary to allow the existence of false opinions and false discourse, and thus the possibility of an interweaving of being and non-being. In the battlefield painted by Plato, a certain opinion, bound up with a certain temperament, keeps eternally rising against the contrary opinion and temperament, whereas the advocates had better learn to reflect a bit.

Childish myths and opinions assured of their truth may well belong to history, but to which, if not a history of the ineradicable errors of imagination and opinion? A proper name that should be crossed out, an attribution that is blocked but cannot be shaken off, an anonymous voice that therefore resembles no other because it has taken every means to keep from resembling itself — all this has conspired to make Plato omnipresent and to make his name a symbol giving way to an indefinite plurality of interpretations.

The history of philosophy that of the philosophers as well as that of the historians has turned Plato into the upholder of a doctrine — Platonism, meaning idealism — on which topic anybody can ramble on at will; of Nietzsche it has better understood the threat he represented but has succeeded in absorbing it, minimizing his violence, relativizing his novelty — for that is what it does best. They have not learned to read and interpret properly. First of all because a philologist claims to be objective: If we assume there is a concern with Democritus.

Then the question always on my lips is this: Why then just Democritus? Why not Heraclitus? Or Philo? Or Bacon? Or Descartes? And in that case, why then just a philosopher? Why not a poet, an orator? And why particularly a Greek? Why not an Englishman, a Turk? Is the past then not large enough to find something, so that you do not make yourself so ridiculous on your own? Indeed, they go so far as to assume that the man whom a moment of the past does not affect the slightest is the most competent to present it.

Philologues and Greeks frequently behave towards each other in this way. They do not concern themselves with each other in the slightest. That is what is called real "objectivity"! They are not verdicts or truths, they depend upon the different perspectives from which the images are built; images do not obey the principle of identity and are not subjected to the principle of contradiction, they configure themselves.

In the struggle of instincts, of individuals, peoples, philosophers, he sees evidence of a superabundance of strength, and in a wish for perpetual peace the symptom of an exhausted life. This wish underlies any history of philosophy, and the Hegelian one, a history of the reconciliation of contradictions, speaks the truth of it.

But when the contradictions are neither doctrinal nor logical nor moral, far from having to be overcome they must be sought, for struggle is the only way for a strength to assess its own power and to increase it. But how proud I am to have such an adversary. From Thales to Socrates each philosopher represents a fully realized and original type, something that has not been the case ever since Plato. From then on, one meets only hybrids. Each of those kingly and solitary figures possessed the power to create and to embody a beautiful possibility of life, beautiful because it is embodying a new possibility.

Consequently, it seems as if these magnificent philosophers have lived in vain. Instincts and bodies were healthier and stronger, not yet repressed by an ascetic regime, not yet transfixed with guilt, not yet bruised by work and agitation, but glorified by art. Life was not yet divided into the spiritual and the bodily, the most dreadful impulses, the wildest and cruelest forces were institutionalized without being tamed. He approaches the first philosophers neither in the manner of antiquarian history, indifferent to differences in greatness, nor in that of critical history which interprets the past from the point of view of a strengthless present, but in a way dangerously close to being of the monumental sort.

With the first philosophers a new instinct has come onto the stage, the drive for knowledge; and like any instinct it wants to dominate. Later, no order dominates any more. Time leaps from event to event, but events are only events for somebody. The problem presents itself differently, it is no longer as an historian that one must approach the philosophers but as a physiologist and a psychologist: one must view them as so many symptoms.

Schopenhauer has an edge on Kant: at least he possesses a certain vehement ugliness of nature; in hatred, cravings, vanity, distrust, he is by disposition more savage and had time and leisure for this savagery. With this term Nietzsche refers both to one's nature, which is a sort of constellation of surging forces, and to the image one wants to have and to project of oneself. The personality lies somewhere between these two extremes, character and personage, and becomes the criterion of an evaluation: all philosophers cannot be included in one and the same story.

Since every criterion depends on a perspective, as the perspective changes the evaluation changes too. Thought is not alive in either of them, they are thinking without passion and their philosophy experiences neither events, nor dramas: it has no history — this kind of history calls for something of a novelist to be told in a way as that does it justice.

It is his present that makes Nietzsche meet this or that philosopher, and it is his present that determines his pro's and con's. At a certain moment in his own history, from a certain point of view, he looks for predecessors whose lists may vary but always include Plato. What each predecessor conveys is a pathos — the unique coloration and vibration proper to his thought.

I too have been in the underworld, even as Odysseus, and I shall often be there again. Not sheep alone have I sacrificed that I might be able to converse with a few dead souls, but not even my own blood have I spared. With them I have to come to terms. When I have long wandered alone, I will let them prove me right or wrong; to them will I listen, if they prove each other right or wrong.

In all that I say, conclude, or think out for myself and others, I fasten my eyes on those eight and see their eyes fastened on mine. May the living forgive me if I look upon them at times as shadows, so pale and fretful, so restless and, alas! Those eight, on the other hand, seem to me so living that I feel as if even now, after their death, they could never become weary of life.

It takes the form of a double dialogue: he listens to the philosophers engaging in dialogue with each other and he dialogues with them, waiting for them to answer him. That does not mean one must have lived such experiences before reading: one must live them through reading, and sometimes it is by rewriting that one best reads and understands.

To overcome his time in himself, to become "untimely". With what must he therefore engage in the hardest combat? With whatever marks him as the child of his time. Well, then! The philosopher in me resisted. Leaving out the third case: one must be both — a philosopher. One might find here an explanation for what has often been noticed but never explained. In Plato only the dead dialogue, dead men who might well be for him more alive than the living.

If death were a journey, says Socrates: what could be a greater good than that: If upon arriving in Hades, liberated from those claiming to be judges, one will find judges who are veritable judges, those who are said to render justice down below — Minos, Rhadamanthus, Aiacus, Triptolemus and all those among the demigods that in their own lives were just — how could such a journey be worthless?

To be also in the company of Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, Homer, what price would not any of you be willing to pay for that? As for me, I would die a thousand deaths if all this is true. Socrates here is using the myth he told at the end of the Gorgias. Zeus decides that the verdicts of present judges are faulty because judges and judged are both clothed, the judges being disguised as judges and the judged being covered with the cloth they wore 44 CW, Preface.

All that is a mere show of justice or knowledge thus falls away, as it does in each of Plato's Dialogues: he chooses the judge by whom he would like to be proved right — Heraclitus or Parmenides, Protagoras or Gorgias — a judge he therefore needs to strip naked. Rather would I be a day laborer in Hades among the shades of the past! Even the underworldly are plumper and fuller than you. This, indeed this, is bitterness for my bowels, that I can endure you neither naked nor clothed, you men of today.

For Plato, it is reanimation that permits to dialogue with the dead, and for Nietzsche it is transfusion, but Plato is also the best example of the transfusion Nietzsche describes. Nietzsche chooses without hesitation: Plato did everything he could in order to read something refined and noble into the proposition of his teacher — above all, himself.

He was the most audacious of all interpreters and took the whole Socrates only the way one picks a popular tune and folk song from the streets in order to vary it into the infinite and impossible — namely, into all of his own masks and multiplicities. Their thought confines into the past only what deserves to be whether it is outdated or comes about in a present that is fated to pass away just as quickly as it has appeared.

Each of their thoughts contains all its past and all its future, and they do not shrink from contradictions. If Plato is a Heraclitean with Cratylus, an Eleatic with Parmenides, and a sophist with Gorgias and Protagoras, his energy is at the same time directed against Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the sophists.

Nietzsche has in 48 Grg. KSA 8 27[75]. To find all this negligible certainly makes it easier to include them in a history one may rightly fear it will offer nothing but disadvantages to life — the history of philosophy, which for both of them is first a matter of listening justly.

To attempt to make them dialogue and to treat as secondary what he who came after may have said about him who came long before —wouldn't this mean indulging a series of subjective and arbitrary projections? Not only did they not forbid it, but they blithely practiced it, not because for them time is a mere cloud but because it is discontinuous, interrupted as it is by instants of change.

Such an instant, irreversible, irrecoverable, each of them embodied, in his own way. Platonism as a Doctrine of Two Worlds That is why we must take up the discussion starting from the structure of Platonism so as to elucidate its reversal. For Plato the suprasensible is the true world. It is situated in the heights, as being what gives the measure of all things.

The sensible is situated in the lower regions, as being the apparent world. The higher world being the exclusive measure of all things is from the beginning the desirable world. After the reversal — as from a formal point of view it is easy to evaluate — the sensible, the apparent world, is situated above, the suprasensible, the true world, below.

And since reversing a metaphysics is still to do metaphysics, Heidegger would be right to see Nietzsche as the last metaphysician. And yet for the reversal to be total, it would be necessary for everything that was above to turn up below and vice versa. Besides the fact that this amounts to constructing, as Nietzsche foresaw, the system he had carefully sought to avoid, it also amounts to attributing to him, who had always maintained he had not been a 1 Heidegger, Nietzsche 1 Krell, p.

On what texts does Heidegger rely to attribute this to him? The Fragment My philosophy, Platonism inverted: the further one distances from true being, the purer more beautiful better it is. Life in appearance as goal. Das Leben im Schein als Ziel. What, then, does the reversal consist in? Clearly enough it is the goal that Nietzsche intends to invert. What Nietzsche opposes in Plato is not a thesis but a perspective: from the point of view of life, it is better to distance oneself from true being as far as possible.

Furthermore, the Heideggerean reading leads to a curious consequence. If the 2 KSA 1 N , 7[]. The inversion would switch the contents but retain the values, in particular the value attributed to what is true. But once the thought of the eternal recurrence had occurred to Nietzsche, it would, Heidegger says, have become impossible for him to conceive of becoming in the Heraclitean fashion as the unceasing flow of all things.

Now, this position with regard to being in its totality as an eternal flow Fluss Nietzsche had adopted without hesitation before the thought of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same came to him. But […] from the moment this thought constitutes belief proper, i. Life is appearance and only appearance, a lightsome and infinitely changing play of creation and destruction of forms, of appearing and disappearing contradictory impulses which are the inexhaustible wellsprings of metamorphoses.

Appearance, moreover, mocks itself. Being alive and effective is the only reality. But it happens that Nietzsche had answered this in advance: The pleasure of thinking. An artist cannot tolerate any effective reality Wirklichkeit […] he seriously thinks that what a thing is worth is the phantom- like remainder schattengleiche Rest that one makes with colors, with form, sound, thoughts […] the less real, the more value je weniger real, um so mehr Werth.

This was the greatest re-baptism Umtaufung : and since it has been taken up by Christianity, we no longer perceive this amazing thing. The first consists in viewing the pleasure of thinking as a particular case of the pleasure taken in creating and in what one creates. He had strength enough to impose this stupendous reversal, but he carried it off so thoroughly we no longer perceive it as such.

He ought to have confessed he was not aiming at anything existing but was positing an ideal in his own likeness, which he has been able to make shine as purer, more beautiful, and better. It consists of six stages. The first three retrace the establishment of the true world and the last two its suppression, with the fourth effecting a transition. The true world — attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man, — he lives in it, he is it. Oldest form of the idea, relatively smart [klug], simple, and persuasive.

Transcription [Umschreibung] of the sentence: "I, Plato, am the truth. Or rather, he is that world, the sun that rises is the sun of truth as he represents it and embodies it. It is a truth smart enough, and at the same time simple simpel enough, to be convincing — an ethical truth.

Thinking Ideas Das Denken der Ideen and the interpretation of Being des Seins that is initiated angesetzte are creative in and of themselves. The work of Plato is not yet Platonism. Plato reappears in the fifth stage: 5. The "true" world — an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating — an idea which has become useless and superfluous —, therefore, a refuted idea: let us abolish it! Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens and cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush; pandemonium of all free spirits.

We have now to fight against the latter. The one is destructive, the other affirmative, and both are indispensable for something else to begin. For Nietzsche does not only want to abolish the two worlds, he wants to abolish them as worlds. Everything that comes to exist in a world must conform with the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience in 7 Heidegger, Nietzsche 1 Krell, p. The cheerfulness Heiterkeit , the gay science, requires that spirit emancipate itself from the errors of reason: the very idea of world, and the organized totality it implies, is one of them.

Nietzsche is recounting the history of a double error of reason, the error that breaks up the world into a true world and an apparent world, and the error that consists in positing an idea of world. He is not recounting the history of metaphysics but the history of the gradual weakening of an idea that disappears not because it is false but because it has become useless — because spirit, having been strengthened by this ancient error, no longer needs it.

A new hierarchy, a new institution of values comes to this: to transform completely the hierarchical schema. It is to that extent that the reversal Umdrehung will become an expulsion Herausdrehung of Platonism. How far it extends and has been able to extend in Nietzsche, how far did he or did he not go in his overcoming of Platonism, are as many necessary questions for criticism … Here are the necessary questions: We ask: What new interpretation and what new scaling Einstufung of the sensible and the non-sensible result from this reversal Umdrehung of Platonism?

What sort of metamorphosis accompanies the reversal Umdrehung? What sort of metamorphosis underlies it? The idea of a reversal of Platonism is not only entirely absent from 9 See infra chap. Not that there are no reversals for him, but as it is for Plato, it is a reversal from despair to gay science, a reversal that has nothing metaphysical about it, a question of health or sickness: In Genoa, one evening, at the hour of the twilight, I heard the bells chiming slowly from a tower; they […] vibrated with a sound as if insatiable for itself… Then came to my mind the words of Plato and I felt them all at once in my heart: nothing that is human, nothing, deserves great seriousness; and yet How otherwise turn Nietzsche into a metaphysician?

But for Heidegger Plato is only a secondary target. Plato, Leg. Certainly, but our first concern should be: why does that question assume this particular form for both? Such a movement, however, can be investigated neither from the outside — as if when attempting to grasp it one could stop thinking, and as if the thinking subject could become an object of thought — nor from within, as if one could describe what is happening while it is happening.

Nietzsche, for his part, is aware that thinking is a flux that carries along with it and dissolves the thinking subject in the alterity of its becoming. To leave the question open does not mean that it is still awaiting the discovery of some proper terms that would permit it to be posed and resolved, for such proper terms do not exist.

Thinking, for them, can no more be made the object of a question than the object of a problem, either because it has its roots in the depth of the body, or because human thought is but a fragment of some higher and unknown kind of thought. In one word, for both Plato and Nietzsche, it is an enigma. For both tell very curious stories about it indeed, but then it is not about thinking they are speaking but about thought, and about their thoughts.

Thinking thoughts Socrates: Thinking dianoeisthai — is what you call thinking just what I call it? Theaetetus: What do you call it? Socrates: Talk logos that the soul has with itself about whatever it is examining. But this is how it manifests indalletai itself to me when a soul is thinking: it is simply carrying on a dialogue in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, and affirms and denies. A soul can no more think itself while thinking3 than an eye can see itself while it is seeing.

But, just as one can set out the conditions for the process of vision and analyze it, one can determine on what occasion a soul starts thinking and describe the form the process takes on. It does not divide — conflicts between its impulses are not dialogues — but doubles itself. When one addresses someone else, the other one is not one among others. To speak to oneself is not to perform a monologue but neither is it to speak to others. To think implies this doubling and redoubling of the same in the other and the other in the same, and when the soul reunifies itself it stops thinking.

He hopes to reach a judgment krinein about what he is observing. Protarchus: Yes. Socrates: And then, will he not start asking himself in the following way Protarchus: What way? Protarchus: Certainly. Protarchus: Surely. Socrates: But if on the contrary he is mistaken, he will perhaps say to himself that what he perceives is a statue fashioned by some shepherd?

Protarchus: Yes, perfectly. A deficient perception does awaken a desire not to think but to judge, a desire not to question but to hit upon the right answer. He could decide to come closer in order to perceive more distinctly, or to wait for something that will permit him to decide, such as this supposed statue beginning to move. For it may also happen that the walker decides, for no reason, as to the nature of what he sees, and forms an opinion about it.

The three texts describing the psychic process of thinking deal with the possibility of error and false statement, a possibility which only opinion offers. But once it [the soul that is thinking] comes to a decision, whether having arrived at it quite slowly or more quickly, and now affirms the same thing from then on and no longer wavers, that is what we set down as its own opinion.

Its natural inclination leads this sort of thought toward an opinion, and therefore toward its own suppression, haunted as it is by its desire to dispense with thinking, with thinking even the impoverished kind of thought that torments it when it perceives deficiently or not at all. And yet, if it did not stop, it would be condemned to ruminate at length over the same thing.

Whether silent or orally expressed his dialogue would remain the same. From the hierarchical point of view according to which the Divided Line is ordered in the Republic, the succession is inverted: thought dianoia follows opinion. Opinion is an inferior mode of cognition, and a necessary one.

The stage of an opinion certain of its judgments is primary neither in the psychological and descriptive order nor in the 9 Tht. If it were, thinking would amount to judging and would always be characterized by the modalities of judgment, namely affirming and denying. Dialectic would then be a method, not a return to what differentiates thought from every other state a soul can be in, namely the state in which it questions itself and answers itself.

Thinking always presents itself in the form of an inner dialogue, but under what circumstances does it arise? The deficiency of perception does not of itself awaken the activity of the intellect, because perception might be enough to enable us to identify the object. But no perception can permit one to decide between two opposite qualities presented by a single object, or between two contradictory judgments upon the same reality.

The soul may, on this occasion, become conscious that it is only by itself that it can overcome the contradiction, but even then it is not obliged to do so, since it is possible for it to neglect these contradictions or to exploit them for eristic purposes.

Contradictions, however, impede the spontaneous movement by which thought is led to judge. If it then turns toward other realities, it takes on a different form and changes from dialogical to dialectical. When it dialectizes soul speaks to itself, but what can be said about this different way of speaking?

Socrates: Is it not the man who knows how to ask questions? Hermogenes: Yes, certainly. Socrates: And that same man also knows how to answer? Hermogenes: Yes. Socrates: And the man who knows how to ask and how to answer, do you call him anything other than a dialectician? Hermogenes: No, that is certainly his name. But Plato never says, neither here nor anywhere else, what that knowing consists in.

It is embodied in Socrates, who is certain of nothing but of the difference between knowledge and opinion, certain of nothing but the uncertainty of a thought that never has at its disposal the objective criterion that would make it certain of its own difference. When the question of the difference between dialectical science and mathematical thought is brought up again in the Philebus, none of the criteria stated in the Republic is taken up and no new criterion is put forward.

To put it differently, thinking for Plato finds itself always waiting in the wings. That is why it one has to discover anew every time and combine all the methods available for thinking better, for thinking more, never ceasing to learn what it means to do so, without ever succeeding to know what it is. For if thinking always doubles itself in a movement that returns to itself, this return is not a return to its identity but to its difference: to a reasserted interrogative modality, not to a fixed essence.

Because it is recounted, a dialogue cannot leave out place, duration, or body: it is incarnate in characters who arrive and leave, speak and keep silent, have certain emotions or moods, laugh or become irritated, and undergo moments of exhilaration or discouragement.

The only being we know is the representing-being das vorstellende Sein. If we describe it correctly, the predicates of this being must absolutely be there. The knowledge it has of itself is that of a changing being, stabilized only by the fact that it is spoken of, although it is perpetually relative to and conditioned by what it represents.

Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an I, or still more of an I as cause, and finally of an I as cause of thoughts? The desire to question inverts the value of certitude and incertitude, just as Plato had done. Can one go further and say that in Nietzsche this interrogative thinking gives birth to a dialogical logos?

One also encounters dialogues between two unidentified interlocutors — like the one between A and B in the Gay Science. He always gives lines to those he is attacking, and he exhorts his disciples, his brothers — whose presence is given as little substance and colour as the interlocutors chosen by the Eleatic Visitor — to grasp, just as he does, what his interlocutors mean to say behind what they are actually saying. Nobody recounts anything new to me, so I recount myself to myself.

And let me be thankful. Finally, in the fourth Book, all the interlocutors except for the kings are placed in the singular: the leech, the Magician, the ugliest man, the old Pope, the voluntary beggar… Zarathustra no longer contends with types but with caricatures of himself, whose speeches ape his own and with whom one could confuse him. Letter to F.

Overbeck, 22 Oct Teichmuller's Die Wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt appeared in Even with thoughts Gedanken — even with the most abstract — does he not deal with them the same way one would if they were individuals with whom one has to wrestle, to whom one ought to become attached, whom one omust protect, care for, nourish?

He considers them as species of pets he must take care of. Their plurality bars him from viewing himself as their author; their independence forces him to admit that they arise unforeseeably; but he is always trying to get some grip on them, even the most abstract ones. The thinker suffers under the force he gives to his thoughts. A Wanderer is more an explorer than a traveller. Wotan takes on the garb of a Wanderer in Wagner. When a given thought is not affected by a more or less well-intentioned or ill- intentioned exercise of our sovereignty, it is the thought that reigns: we surrender to its power, all the while respecting ourselves in this thought.

How do our thoughts exercise their power to dominate us? By judging us, by praising us or blaming us. A new thought rewards us if it teaches us, if it destroys a prejudice, a silliness, a conviction; but it may at the same time despise us for having been unaware of it so long. Behind these scenes of conjugal life of a thinker battling with his thoughts, a struggle is being played out between certain powers of differing quality and intensity. How thoughts come How does a new thought come?

The learn-then-know sequence relates to ordinary temporality, to common sense: one learns so as to know; it is this direction that the hypothesis of anamnesis aims to subvert. Its purpose is not only to answer a sophistic paradox but to suppress the distinction between knowing and learning. Story 3 Therefore, since the soul is immortal and many times reborn, and since it has seen all things, both the things here and the things that are in Hades, it is not possible that there is anything it has not learned.

Socrates selects a geometrical problem — his first piece of trickery since a geometrical figure forces by itself a transition from perception to conception, but this shift forces itself only on someone who knows he is seeing a diagram and not a mere drawing: the slave boy is not too ignorant to know this. Moreover, when does he remember? Not when he is wrong. Then when? Not when he produces the right answer, for it is suggested to him by Socrates — a second piece of trickery.

Despite all this, the boy has come to understand that some solutions were false and has recognized the one that was true. In this, he has performed an act of recollection. Nothing warrants that he will pose questions of this kind to himself on his own, or that knowledge will substitute itself for the right but unstable opinion he has acquired. Nevertheless, thanks to his dialogue with him, Socrates has succeeded in showing that an anamnesis is not the instant reminder of some particular knowledge but that it means searching, running the risk of being wrong, understanding what mistakes were made, and continuing to search: learning.

What is the connection with the immortality of the soul, its pre- existence, its previous omniscience? In the Phaedo,40 recollection is a state proper to lovers only: they alone are able to move from the perception of a thing to the conception of a thing that is absent, whose presence however is for them more real than that of the object that is there for them to see.

To conceive within oneself ennoein , upon seeing a lyre, the eidos of the boy to whom this lyre belongs, establishes already that the soul has the ability to free itself from a fascination with things. When it is the soul of a philosopher, this ability is a twofold ability: to be affected both by what is intelligible and by the lack of intelligibility in what is sensible—these two abilities being obviously connected to each other.

Recollection is therefore neither a knowledge nor a method but a pathos, it is the state of a soul that understands that it can learn only by itself and has to turn back into itself. Knowing and not-knowing must be thought of dynamically, as psychic movements that are constantly re-initiating each other, rather than as objects of a meta-epistemology.

All of that finds itself 39 Men. Eros is what philosophizes in us, since it is never satisfied with what is given witness the whole ascent of the Symposium. Recollection is the experience of the erotic nature of the connection between soul and intelligible realities, and it sets to rest all the difficulties proper to the notion of participation when understood as a problematical relation between two completely different kinds of objects. The sensible particular does not a priori contain an essence that came to it from who- knows-where-or-how, and which would be the condition of its knowability.

There are not two sorts of anteriority, an anteriority for us, referring to the successive stages of human cognition, and an anteriority in itself. When it thinks the soul takes on a different mode of being but this kind of being is not the essence of the human soul as such. It is for the philosopher a mode of being that is merely possible and which he can only emulate.

For non- philosophers, sensible flux provisionally stabilized by opinion is enough. The problem of sensible cognition comes second, and is secondary in relation to the problem that thought is for itself, a problem that cannot be posed in terms of objects. What thought examines and questions turns out to be affected by it, it endows everything it questions with an intelligible being ousia , which in its turn has the power to affect thought by presenting itself under different angles.

Nor does the problem pose itself in terms of conditions, for there are no limits at the outset, limits are only encountered along the way, and as such might be superable. In what terms, then, should the question of thought properly be posed? In terms of imprisonment and liberation, of eros, of drive, of giving birth and of fecundity.

Recollection enables thought to forgo the support of memory and the continuity that its own memory would impose on it. There is 42 Cf. The hypothesis of reminiscence frees thought from this by making its future and its past overlap each other, since while it is moving forward it is moving backward. So it can freely set itself to learn, that is, to remember, as the occasion presents itself. Forgetting everything, which is a fundamental dimension of recollection, implies discontinuity and thus the irruption of a crowd of new thoughts.

Thanks to this, thought liberates itself from a time which is its own flowing as well as its own accumulation. This happy forgetting endows each thought with its newness, and the identity of learning and remembering exempts thought from asking questions about its own origin and of its possibility — questions whose effect generally is to make thought depend upon one or several primary principles. Whether a myth or an hypothesis, recollection suffices to root thought in a depth that remains unknown to it, so that metaphysics, as a system, is unneeded.

To introduce the genesis of a thought means for Nietzsche to discover the ingredient of opacity, of the unknown, that is to be found in every thought: Behind your thoughts and your sentiments there is your body, and your self within your body: the terra incognita.

For what purpose do you have such thoughts and such sentiments? Your self, within your body, wants, by means of this, something. The use of a political vocabulary is not here metaphorical, it rather has the function of what Plato calls a paradigm, an analogy with an heuristic function. No boss needs to know in detail what each of his subordinates is doing nor how they are doing it, he only needs to be obeyed This psychological vocabulary serves another purpose: to deprive the soul but also consciousness, intellect, reason of the privileges they are always granted, whereas we are endowed with them only because our body is.

Body is spirit. This statement is the opposite of a materialistic reduction: it is not spirit which is body, but body which is spirit. The depriving consists not in a reduction of the psychological to the physiological the physiological is psychological , but rather in a multiplication: consciences, intellects, reasons, are innumerable in everybody. This twofold illusion is however necessary for any ruling authority, it must be assured of its difference and derives from it its right to exercise its authority.

In the body, not in the depths of human soul, there resides a multiplicity of artists at work. Our body fools us by assimilating, equalizing, simplifying so as to convey to consciousness things and qualities that enable it to judge and act. It passes on to our conscience certain emotions, sentiments, passions. While it lends the world the qualities of the useful and the harmful, it also lends it those of the beautiful and the ugly, of the seductive and the repulsive, of the sublime and the horrifying.

It makes us perceive a quantity of useless qualities, showing thus something of a playful instinct. As it is at once sensorial and sensible, it is its functions — self-regulation, assimilation, nutrition, secretion, exchanges — with which we endow spirit by metaphorizing them into logical operations: judgment, deduction, inference, analysis and synthesis.

Do we not find here the reversal of a Platonism that aims at purifying thought from all contamination by a body viewed only as an obstacle or a tomb? The soul is not, for Plato, a substance separated from the body; if some men hold that it must separate itself from its body, its separation is 48 KSA 11 37[4]. For this body, insofar as it selectively senses what can affect it, is in its own way already thinking — or as Nietzsche puts it, within the body there are multiple souls.

A thought is a sign whose meaning is multiple and condensed: it calls for a will to interpret it and reduce its polysemy. When, one day, a thought comes to appear dubious to us, then, indefatigable kingmakers in the history of the spirit that we are, we oust it from the throne and zealously elevate its adversary to the seat. Supposing that one would be good enough to weigh it and reflect on it a little more, surely no 51 Phd.

But the pride invoked in this aphorism from Human, All Too Human is still an insufficient explanation: it allows the opposition of true and false to subsist. Hearkening to his pride, the thinker prefers what is true to what is false, but true and false are criticized only from a theoretical point of view.

Genuine criticism does not stay fixed on its object but is self-overcoming, self-criticism, it finds its place not in the general history of the spirit but in a singular becoming. True and false are predicates we attribute to what was once necessary and then ceased to be so. Yet Nietzsche desires to be contradicted, and rewrites it in his own way the Socratic theme of the benefit in being refuted: If I seem to you to be saying something true, agree with me; if not, resist me with all the arguments at your disposal, taking care that in my eagerness I do not deceive myself — and you too at the same time.

One will have understood that these are painful truths […] — Although on precisely that point, and to speak candidly, I would very willingly partake of the pleasure of being contradicted Then begins another story, the story not of Mr. Nietzsche but of Zarathustra. Story 4 The doves, the birds of the Holy Spirit, circle around Zarathustra, who at first wards them off, but then understands that the sign has come, that he has nothing more to say No to, nothing more to destroy, but that he only has to let his thoughts alight upon him.

That is how Thus Spoke Zarathustra ends, and this is how the morning of Zarathustra begins: But then it happened that he suddenly heard himself surrounded as by an innumerable swarming and fluttering of birds: but the whirring of so many wings and the thronging about his head were so great that he closed his eyes. They are a numberless crowd, they fly about then land with 57 KSA 11 37[1].

KSA 12 2[]. Plurality, fleetingness, rhythm, are the characteristics of becoming. The becoming of thoughts and of each thought is both necessary and unfounded, like becoming itself. Plato and Nietzsche both discard the possibility of a self-reflection of thinking. For neither of them does thinking possess an immutable essence or a logical structure that would make it possible to arrive at a definition of it or to fix its nature.

Thinking is for them undergoing and thus changing. They have no more any immediate certainty about it. Both of them have an experience of thinking that makes impossible any knowledge, any definition of what it is, and so any problematization is foiled. But thought can be described in its genesis and unfolding, and differentiated in its kinds and its moments, it lends itself to being narrated, but one must think in a certain way to judge it is amenable to it.

The stories that Plato and Nietzsche tell about the origin, birth and paths of thought are not anecdotal information. For them to break out of a logical space and enter a narrative space is to break away not from concepts but from the necessity of thinking only by means of concepts — which would make one the prisoner of the concepts he has constructed.

Feeling free to give a non-conceptual meaning to what is called thinking endows their thought with a tonality, a color, a rhythm — dimensions the two of them happen to share. Dimensions Thinking is war. When does Phaedo tell us that Socrates is most admirable? A pause, a retreat occurs every time: Socrates or a Visitor: it hardly matters catches his breath, rallies his broken forces, and then gathers speed.

In each dialogue, opening a path has something heroic to it, for it is necessary not only to overcome objections and difficulties but also to confront laziness, lassitude, moods and emotions. First: I attack only causes that are victorious — on occasion, I wait 'till they are victorious. Second: I attack causes only when there are no allies to be found, when I am standing alone — when I am compromising myself alone […] Third: I never attack persons — I make use of a person only as a kind of strong magnifying glass with which one can make visible some general but insidious and hardly graspable exigency of distress.

To the contrary, attacking is for me a proof of benevolence, even of gratitude. Wagner is a genius, just as Protagoras is great, each in his own area. Thinking is also an adventure, an exploration, a risk to be run: And so, my friends, it seems the game is out on the table before us, and if we agree to risk the outcome of our constitution entirely on one throw of the dice — which might come up three sixes or three ones — let's do it. As for me I shall run this risk with you sunkinduneuein by revealing and explaining my thoughts on education and culture, which got our discourse going.

This risk is surely neither small nor like any other. Do we want to cross the sea? Thinking is joyous. They are the Nietzschean means for overcoming heaviness, the solemnity of the clodhopper, resentment and nihilism. In its better moments thinking is for them inspiration, delirium, enthusiasm. It moves within a time of its own, within all the time it needs, but which nevertheless is not totally independent of a time that is not under its control, which persists in the manner of a progression, measured out in Plato as well as in Nietzsche by the rising and setting of the sun, the hours of high noon and deepest night.

Setting in the background this cycle of daylight and darkness, rising and falling, calls to mind that things do not always become clear in the same way, and that one must recognize degrees of clarity rather than hard and fast oppositions.

Furthermore, light is encountered along the way and doesn't shine only at the beginning or the end, thinking thus being exempted from the invariant clarity of a primary revelation or of a logical imperative. It moves within a time whose duration is marked by thoughts that come up and disappear with unequal evidence and obscurity, unequal speed and slowness.

The fluctuations of light convey the sequence of impasses and discoveries, ascents and descents, advances and retreats, that punctuate thinking, not forgetting the emotions all that induces. In Plato it is instinctively intuited by a nature that allies two contrary tendencies and brings them into an opportune interplay — a characteristic invoking this little , p.

They are hard to move and hard to teach, as if they had become numb; and they are filled with sleep and yawning when they must work through anything of the sort. The body knows this and so does thought, which advances at a varying speed, sometimes proceeding by unjustifiable jumps and sometimes tirelessly explicating itself.

What other philosopher apart from Nietzsche has required them of himself, not as writer but as a philosopher? Lightness comes from quickness, and it takes a long apprenticeship to be able to think fast. The quickness of a thought does not make it unintelligible or futile, but rather leaves open the possibility of viewing things differently: For I approach deep problems as I do a cold bath — fast in, fast out.

And incidentally […]: does a matter stay unrecognized, not understood merely because it has been touched in flight, is only glanced, in a flash? Does one absolutely have to sit firmly on it first? To have brooded on it as on an egg? There is a heavy slowness and a light slowness just as there is a superficial quickness and a quickness that is profound. Every thought calls for its proper tempo: there is no rule.

I have learned to fly: ever since, I no longer need to be pushed before moving along. Now I am light, now I fly, now I see myself beneath myself, now a god dances through me. The dancing lightness is divine because it is alive and rejoices in being alive. There are, in Plato as in Nietzsche, moments when thought dances.

For both of them thinking is an enigma, but not for the same reasons: it would be absurd to pretend otherwise. What does this imply? That for all their ignorance of what thinking is, they know how it must appear, and what meaning they give to it. In Plato, life, whose principle is soul, makes use of what is truly alive in it — namely, thinking — in order not to die, or to die only the death that thinking requires: the separation, both eternal and provisional, of the soul from its body — since the soul is only eternal when it is thinking, and even more so when it thinks of itself as a sort of divine delirium.

In Nietzsche, a kind of becoming, life, plays its innocent game in using a kind of life, thinking, to make sensible the marvelous and inexhaustible plurality of becoming and to become more alive, more light and more risky. Must one abstain from writing, if he thinks? And what happens to a thought if it consents to be pinned down in written characters? These questions are posed in the Phaedrus, and after Plato philosophers barely posed them again, even though Socrates never ceases asking them these questions.

Granting writing the power to fix the thought, to bleach out its color, to circulate it everywhere, he must look for ways to compensate for the loss of vitality it inflicts upon it. A Platonic condemnation of writing? They are treated in the Phaedrus from two different standpoints that affect the meaning of the terms and make interpretation difficult. The only way to steer clear of the traps is to follow the thread of the reasoning closely instead of selecting and taking out of context certain statements found in an over-celebrated and over-commented passage.

But Phaedrus is wrong. They see in writing a chance to demonstrate their personal sophia and thereby become immortal, equal to the gods. The problem with them is the same: their good or bad use. Writing is an activity in itself neutral, neither shameful nor admirable. From the two discursive modes he has affirmed to be axiologically neutral the spoken and the written Socrates moves on to the question of their good and bad use, and then to those who use them: the public orator, who views the political, legislative, and judicial discourses he delivers as instruments of power over souls and as means to achieve his own immortality, and the philosopher for whom discourses are the means to reach truth.

The truth touched upon in the course of this detour is that for writing well and speaking well it is necessary and sufficient to love truth. The dialogue has thus taken another direction, and in this bifurcation has shown its unity. Must one give in to the man who loves, or to the man who 2 Phdr.

Must one give in to the force of a discourse that loves truth, or to the force of one that does not? General rule: divide a complex reality into its kinds according to its capacity to act and be acted upon. Then: establish a typology of souls and a classification of the kinds of discourse in order to guarantee an effective adjustment of the latter to the former. Images Donate icon An illustration of a heart shape Donate Ellipses icon An illustration of text ellipses.

EMBED for wordpress. Want more? Advanced embedding details, examples, and help! Reviewer: archytas - favorite favorite favorite favorite favorite - April 16, Subject: Yes, Internet Archive has Loeb Republic vol. I search for Plato Republic Shorey [without mentioning Loeb. Reviewer: WatchingEthosInFreefall - favorite favorite - June 26, Subject: Missing Pages liii - 40 Pages between lii and 41 missing; appear to have been removed from specimen and not noticed by person scanning.

This is a bit frustrating because this is the beginning of Book I and there are no other scans of this Loeb's edition volume currently available on this site, or any other editions containing both the Greek text and English translation in one volume. Folkscanomy: A Library of Books.

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